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Henrique Oyamaa, Helen Durand∗,a
aDepartment of Chemical Engineering and Materials Science, Wayne State University, Detroit, MI 48202, USA.
Abstract
The use of an integrated system framework, characterized by numerous cyber/physical components
(sensor measurements, signals to actuators) connected through wired/wireless networks, has not
only increased the ability to control industrial systems, but also the vulnerabilities to cyberattacks.
State measurement cyberattacks could pose threats to process control systems since feedback control
may be lost if the attack policy is not thwarted. Motivated by this, we propose three detection con-
cepts based on Lyapunov-based economic model predictive control (LEMPC) for nonlinear systems.
The rst approach utilizes randomized modications to an LEMPC formulation online to poten-
tially detect cyberattacks. The second method detects attacks when a threshold on the dierence
between state measurements and state predictions is exceeded. Finally, the third strategy utilizes
redundant state estimators to ag deviations from normal process behavior as cyberattacks.
Key words: Control system cybersecurity, model predictive control, chemical process control,
nonlinear systems, state estimation.
Introduction
The chemical process industries are potential targets for cyberattacks, with motivations for such
attacks ranging from sabotage of equipment to intellectual property theft.1,2 Attacks on elements
of control systems have the potential to create unsafe or economically unfavorable operating condi-
tions. In light of this, attack detection has received focus in the literature (e.g.,3,4). Attack detection
methods for cyber-physical systems have included those which are data-based for applications such
as water systems5 and smart grids.6 In addition, resilient control designs based on state estimation
∗Corresponding author: H. Durand, Tel: +1 (313) 577-3475; E-mail: helen.durand@wayne.edu.
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have been developed for handling and detecting attacks. For example, Cardenas et al.4 proposes
cyberattack-resilient control frameworks that compare state estimates based on representative mod-
els of the physical system and (potentially corrupted) state measurements to detect an attack. In,7
the theoretical conditions for a linear system that bound the maximum number of sensors that may
provide false measurements while still allowing reconstruction of the state for a feedback controller
are dened.
The incorporation of cyberattack detection and resilience into control systems also has been
studied in the context of model predictive control (MPC8), an advanced control methodology that
uses optimization to determine the inputs to a plant. In the power systems domain, MPC has been
integrated with data-based detection and state reconstruction via a process model to recover perfor-
mance of the power grid in the presence of sensor attacks.9 For linear systems, MPC designs have
been explored that can guarantee exponential stability of the origin in the presence of suciently
short denial of service attacks,10 guarantee boundedness of the closed-loop state in an invariant
set under random cyberattacks on the sensor measurements,11 and handle replay attacks.12 For
nonlinear systems, Chen et al.13 combined a neural network-based attack detection technique de-
veloped in3 with a two-layer control architecture, where the upper layer is a Lyapunov-based MPC,
to guarantee closed-loop stability after attacks are detected. Durand14 explored several MPC tech-
niques with economics-based objective functions (known as economic MPC's (EMPC's)15,16) in the
presence of false sensor measurements to explore cyberattacks in a nonlinear systems context. The
impacts of cyberattacks on MPC's were also related to process and equipment design in.17 However,
further understanding of the interaction between cyberattack detection strategies and MPC/EMPC
formulation and stability guarantees is still needed.
This motivates our development in this work of three cyberattack detection strategies that
are integrated with a specic control framework known as Lyapunov-based EMPC (LEMPC),18
enabling the co-design of the control and detection frameworks to provide guarantees regarding
detection characteristics and closed-loop stability in the absence of and, under sucient conditions
and potentially for limited timeframes, the presence of, cyberattacks. The rst control/detection
strategy toggles between a full state feedback LEMPC and variations on that control law that are
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randomly generated over time to probe for cyberattacks. The second control/detection strategy
also utilizes full state feedback LEMPC, but the detection is based on the state prediction from
the prior state measurement to identify an attack while maintaining the closed-loop state within
a characterizable region over one sampling period after an attack that is not detected. Finally
the third control/detection concept is developed using output feedback LEMPC and comparing
multiple redundant state estimates based on the available state measurements to signal an attack
when the estimates do not agree while ensuring closed-loop stability under sucient conditions
(which include that not all sensors can be attacked). This work extends the results presented
in.19,20 The attack type considered throughout is a sensor measurement cyberattack due to the
consistency of this attack with the attack design considered in various other works (e.g.,4) and due
to the primary goal of this paper being an exploration of what might be possible to achieve with
integrated control/detection strategies utilizing LEMPC for nonlinear systems.
Preliminaries
Notation
The notation | · | signies the Euclidean norm of a vector. α : [0, a) → [0,∞) is a class K
function if α(0) = 0 and the function is continuous and strictly increasing. Ωρ denotes a level set
of a scalar-valued function V (i.e., Ωρ := {x ∈ Rn : V (x) ≤ ρ}). Set subtraction is signied by ′/′
(i.e., A/B := {x ∈ Rn : x ∈ A, x /∈ B}). xT is the transpose of the vector x. A sampling time is
denoted by tk := k∆, k = 0, 1, . . ., where ∆ is a sampling period.
Class of Systems
This work considers the following class of systems:
ẋ(t) = f(x(t), u(t), w(t)) (1)
where x ∈ X ⊂ Rn, u ∈ U ⊂ Rm, and w ∈ W ⊂ Rz are the state, input, and disturbance vectors,
respectively, and f is locally Lipschitz on X×U×W . We dene W := {w ∈ Rz | |w| ≤ θw, θw > 0}
and U := {u ∈ Rm| |u| ≤ umax}. We consider that the nominal system of Eq. 1 (w ≡ 0)
is stabilizable such that there exists an asymptotically stabilizing feedback control law h(x), a
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suciently smooth Lyapunov function V , and class K functions αi(·), i = 1, 2, 3, 4, where:
α1(|x|) ≤ V (x) ≤ α2(|x|) (2a)
∂V (x)
∂x
f(x, h(x), 0) ≤ −α3(|x|) (2b)∣∣∣∣∂V (x)∂x
∣∣∣∣≤ α4(|x|) (2c)
h(x) ∈ U (2d)
∀ x ∈ D ⊂ Rn (D is an open neighborhood of the origin). We dene Ωρ ⊂ D to be the stability
region of the nominal closed-loop system under the controller h(x) and require that it be chosen
such that x ∈ X, ∀x ∈ Ωρ. Furthermore, we consider that h(x) satises:
|hi(x)− hi(x̂)| ≤ Lh|x− x̂| (3)
for all x, x̂ ∈ Ωρ, with Lh > 0, where hi is the i-th component of h, i = 1, . . . ,m.
Because V is a suciently smooth function and f is locally Lipschitz, the following hold:
|f(x1, u1, w)− f(x2, u2, 0)| ≤ Lx|x1 − x2|+ Lu|u1 − u2|+ Lw|w| (4a)∣∣∣∣∂V (x1)∂x f(x1, u, w)− ∂V (x2)∂x f(x2, u, 0)
∣∣∣∣≤ L′x|x1 − x2|+ L′w|w| (4b)
|f(x, u, w)| ≤Mf (5)
∀x1, x2 ∈ Ωρ, u, u1, u2 ∈ U and w ∈ W , where Lx, L′x, Lw, L′w, and Mf are positive constants.
Observability assumption
We consider that there are M sets of measurements yi ∈ Rqi , i = 1, . . . ,M , available at tk:
yi(t) = ki(x(t)) + vi(t) (6)
where ki is a vector-valued function, and vi represents the measurement noise associated with
the measurement yi. We assume that the measurement noise is bounded (i.e., vi ∈ Vi := {vi ∈
Rqi | |vi| ≤ θv,i, θv,i > 0) and that measurements of each yi are continuously available. It is
considered that for each of the M sets of measurements, a deterministic observer exists dened as:
żi = Fi(ϵi, zi, yi) (7)
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where zi is the estimate of the process state from the i-th observer, i = 1, . . . ,M , Fi is a vector-
valued function, and ϵi > 0. When a controller h(zi) with Eq. 7 is used to control the closed-loop
system of Eq. 1, we make the following assumptions.
Assumption 1. 21,22 There exist positive constants θ∗w, θ
∗
v,i, such that for each pair {θw, θv,i} with
θw ≤ θ∗w, θv,i ≤ θ∗v,i, there exist 0 < ρ1,i < ρ, em0i > 0 and ϵ∗Li > 0, ϵ∗Ui > 0 such that if x(0) ∈ Ωρ1,i,
|zi(0)−x(0)| ≤ em0i and ϵi ∈ (ϵ∗Li, ϵ∗Ui), the trajectories of the closed-loop system are bounded in Ωρ,
∀ t ≥ 0.
Assumption 2. 21,22 There exists e∗mi > 0 such that for each emi ≥ e∗mi, there exist tbi(ϵi) such that
|zi(t)− x(t)| ≤ emi, ∀ t ≥ tbi(ϵi).
Remark 1. High-gain observers,23 which are typically analyzed for input-ane systems with a
specic structure (a sub-class of the class of systems of Eq. 1), can satisfy Assumptions 1-2 for
that class of input-ane systems under sucient conditions.
Lyapunov-based Economic Model Predictive Control





Le(x̃(τ), u(τ)) dτ (8a)
s.t. ˙̃x(t) = f(x̃(t), u(t), 0) (8b)
x̃(tk) = x(tk) (8c)
x̃(t) ∈ X, ∀ t ∈ [tk, tk+N) (8d)
u(t) ∈ U, ∀ t ∈ [tk, tk+N) (8e)
V (x̃(t)) ≤ ρe,1, if x(tk) ∈ Ωρe,1 (8f)
∂V (x(tk))
∂x
f(x(tk), u(tk), 0) ≤
∂V (x(tk))
∂x
f(x(tk), h(x(tk)), 0), if x(tk) ∈ Ωρ/Ωρe,1 (8g)
where the notation u(t) ∈ S(∆) denotes that u(t) is a piecewise-constant input vector with N pieces
(N is the prediction horizon), each held for a sampling period of length ∆. The time integral of the
stage cost Le in Eq. 8 is evaluated from tk to tk+N with predictions x̃ of the process state obtained
from Eq. 8b (which represents the nominal model, i.e., the model of Eq. 1 with w(t) ≡ 0). Eq. 8b
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is initialized from the measured state x(tk) at tk via Eq. 8c. Eqs. 8d-8e represent state and input
constraints, respectively. LEMPC is applied in a receding horizon fashion, with the optimal input
computed for t ∈ [tk, tk+1) implemented in a sample-and-hold fashion. Ωρe,1 ⊂ Ωρ is a level set of V
which renders Ωρ forward invariant under the LEMPC of Eq. 8.
Combining Cyberattack Detection and Process Control
In this section, we will develop several techniques for detecting and handling cyberattacks on
controllers that have a form like that in Eq. 8. In a prior work by Wu et al.3 that considered
cyberattack detection mechanisms for nonlinear systems in tandem with a variation on LEMPC, a
neural network-based detection method was designed to detect specic cyberattack scenarios (e.g., a
min-max cyberattack, in which the minimum or maximum allowable sensor measurement values are
provided to the control system), and the controller was assumed to use the state measurement from
secure/redundant sensors after an attack was detected to attempt to maintain the closed-loop state
in a bounded region of state-space. The data-based detection and control method from3 may achieve
appropriate performance for a cyberattack event, but does not guarantee that a cyberattack will be
detected. The present manuscript utilizes a control-theoretic, rather than data-based, framework
to develop three cyberattack detection methods. A goal of this is to avoid the potential limitation
of data-driven methods that they may lack guarantees on detection. The rst control/detection
strategy uses a full state feedback LEMPC as the primary process controller and randomly develops
other LEMPC formulations with the contractive constraint of Eq. 8g always activated that are used
in place of the primary controller for short periods of time to potentially detect if an attack is
happening. The second control/detection strategy also uses full state feedback LEMPC, but the
detection method is based on the state prediction from the last state measurement and it maintains
the closed-loop state within the stability region over one sampling period after the attack under
sucient conditions. Finally, the third control/detection concept uses output feedback LEMPC and
state estimates based on the available state measurements to identify an attack while guaranteeing
that the closed-loop state will not leave the stability region under sucient conditions.
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Detection Strategy 1: Randomized LEMPC Changes to Probe for Cyberattacks
In this section, a potential methodology for probing for cyberattacks is proposed that uses
random modications of the control design in Eq. 8 in a way that should create an expected
outcome if no attack is occurring. Specically, in the absence of an attack, if the contractive
constraint of Eq. 8g is activated, the time derivative of the Lyapunov function along the closed-loop
state trajectory under the controller h(x) is expected to be negative (this would only potentially
not occur if the closed-loop state was in a neighborhood of the steady-state), and therefore, when
Eq. 8g is activated, it would be expected that the Lyapunov function (evaluated at the state
measurements) should decrease for t ∈ [tk, tk+1]. If this did not occur, the process behavior could
be considered abnormal, and could be agged as potentially reecting a cyberattack. However, a
stealthy attacker who knows the LEMPC control law might try to provide state measurements that
imply that the Lyapunov function decreases over the subsequent sampling period when that should
occur according to the formulation in Eq. 8, but cause rogue control actions to be computed. To
attempt to prevent this, we can consider randomly developing new control laws (here selected as
LEMPC's) with characterizable behavior in the absence of an attack (here, a decrease in the value
of the Lyapunov function for the randomly developed LEMPC for t ∈ [tk, tk+1]), and employ them
at random times to make it harder for an attacker to provide false state measurements that would
evade probing for attacks.
We refer to the LEMPC design around the operating steady-state as the (baseline) 1-LEMPC,
which has stability region Ωρ1 , stability region subset Ωρ′e,1 , Lyapunov function V1, and controller
h1 used in its design. The alternative LEMPC's will be referred to as j-LEMPC designs (for j > 1)
with stability region Ωρj , Lyapunov function Vj, and controller hj used in the control design, and
developed around steady-states that are potentially dierent from the operating steady-state (the
j-th steady-states). We also dene fj as the model of Eq. 1 rewritten to have its origin at the j-th
steady-state, and xj and uj as x and u in deviation variable form from the j-th steady-state (Xj and
Uj represent the state and input sets in deviation form from the j-th steady-state). Furthermore,
we assume that Vj and hj satisfy Eqs. 2-5 with αp(·), p = 1, 2, 3, 4, U , Lx, Lw, L′x, L′w, Lu, Lx, Lh
and Mf replaced by αp,j(·), p = 1, 2, 3, 4, Uj, Lx,j, Lw,j, L′x,j, L′w,j, Lu,j, Lx,j, Lh,j and Mf,j.
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The implementation strategy for cyberattack probing uses random generation of steady-states
with stability regions contained within Ωρ1 of the (baseline) 1-LEMPC and that have steady-state
inputs within U to develop new j-LEMPC (j > 1) designs online which can drive the closed-loop
state toward the new (j-th) steady-state in the absence of a cyberattack. The LEMPC of Eq. 8
(with full state feedback) is used until a random sampling time ts,j, j = 2, 3 . . ., when x(tk) ∈ Ωρ1 ,
at which time it is desired to run a check to determine whether a cyberattack is occurring. At this
random time, a (j-th) steady-state is selected that has a stability region around it (Ωρj , j > 1),
contained within Ωρ1 , that includes x(tk) (to ensure that Vj can be decreased in the absence of
an attack from tk to tk+N if an LEMPC with Eq. 8g is used, which can only be guaranteed if the
initial condition is within the stability region for the j-LEMPC, while being maintained within Ωρ1
so that closed-loop stability within Ωρ1 can be maintained when the j-th LEMPC switches back to
the 1-LEMPC after probing). Furthermore, it must be ensured that the designed stability region
does not have x(tk) within a neighborhood of the origin of the new stability region within which
Vj would not be guaranteed to decrease due to the sample-and-hold controller implementation and
disturbances. Once a suitable stability region is generated at ts,j meeting these requirements, an
LEMPC of the form of Eq. 8, but formulated with respect to the j-th steady-state and with Eq. 8g
always activated regardless of the position of the initial state, is selected to control the system for
the next sampling period. Under the sucient conditions to be developed in Section Randomized
LEMPC Changes to Probe for Cyberattacks: Stability and Feasibility Analysis, this ensures a
decrease of Vj over the sampling period following ts,j. Then, at te,j, the j-LEMPC switches back to
operation under the (baseline) 1-LEMPC. The false state measurement cyberattacks in this section
are assumed to lie within Ωρ1 to prevent detection on the basis of the state measurement being
outside of the stability region that it should not exit.
Randomized LEMPC Changes to Probe for Cyberattacks: Formulation
The following two LEMPC formulations are proposed to probe for cyberttacks by interchanging
between these LEMPC designs at random times. These have a form like that in Eq. 8, but one
does not have the constraint of Eq. 8f, and both have dierent steady-states and Lyapunov-based
constraint designs compared to one another. The baseline LEMPC is formulated as follows, which
8





Le(x̃1(τ), u1(τ)) dτ (9a)
s.t. ˙̃x1(t) = f1(x̃1(t), u1(t), 0) (9b)
x̃1(tk) = x̃b,1(tk) (9c)
x̃1(t) ∈ X1, ∀ t ∈ [tk, tk+N) (9d)
u1(t) ∈ U1, ∀ t ∈ [tk, tk+N) (9e)
V1(x̃1(t)) ≤ ρ′e,1, ∀ t ∈ [tk, tk+N), if x̃1(tk) ∈ Ωρ′e,1 (9f)
∂V1(x̃1(tk))
∂x
f1(x̃1(tk), u1(tk), 0) ≤
∂V1(x̃1(tk))
∂x
f1(x̃1(tk), h1(x̃1(tk)), 0), if x̃1(tk) ∈ Ωρ1/Ωρ′e,1
(9g)
where x̃b,1(tk) is used, with slight abuse of notation, to reect the state measurement in deviation
variable form from the operating steady-state.





Le(x̃j(τ), uj(τ)) dτ (10a)
s.t. ˙̃xj(t) = fj(x̃j(t), uj(t), 0) (10b)
x̃j(tk) = x̃b,j(tk) (10c)
x̃j(t) ∈ Xj, ∀ t ∈ [tk, tk+N) (10d)
uj(t) ∈ Uj, ∀ t ∈ [tk, tk+N) (10e)
∂Vj(x̃j(tk))
∂x
fj(x̃j(tk), uj(tk), 0) ≤
∂Vj(x̃j(tk))
∂x
fj(x̃j(tk), hj(x̃j(tk)), 0) (10f)
where x̃b,j(tk) represents the state measurement in deviation variable form from the j-th steady-
state. A state measurement cyberattack on Eqs. 9-10 could cause x̃b,1(tk) in Eq. 9c and x̃b,j(tk) in
Eq. 10c to not necessarily be reective of the actual process state.
Randomized LEMPC Changes to Probe for Cyberattacks: Implementation Strategy
The implementation strategy for this detection method is as follows, and includes a region
Ωρsamp2,1 , which will be claried in Section Randomized LEMPC Changes to Probe for Cyberattacks:
Stability and Feasibility Analysis and is chosen such that if the actual state is in Ωρsamp2,1 ⊂ Ωρ1 ,
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under sucient conditions, then the closed-loop state and the state measurement are maintained
in Ωρ1 for t ≥ 0:
1. At a sampling time tk, the 1-LEMPC receives the state measurement x̃b,j(tk). Go to Step 2.
2. At tk, an index ζ is set to a random number. If this number falls within a range that
has been selected to initiate probing for cyberattacks, randomly generate a j-th steady-state
(j > 1) with a stability region Ωρj ⊂ Ωρsamp2,1 that has a steady-state input within the input
bounds and contains the state measurement x̃b,j(tk) (and where x̃b,j(tk) ∈ Ωρh,j ⊂ Ωρj ⊂
Ωρsamp2,1 , which will be also claried in Section Randomized LEMPC Changes to Probe for
Cyberattacks: Stability and Feasibility Analysis and Ωρh,j is selected such that if the state
measurement at tk is in Ωρh,j , under sucient conditions, then the closed-loop state and the
state measurement are maintained in Ωρj for t ≥ 0, with the measured value of the state not
in a neighborhood Ωρs,j ⊂ Ωρh,j of the origin of the j-th steady-state). Set ts,j = tk, select
te,j = tk+1, and go to Step 4. Otherwise, if the value of ζ falls in a range which has not been
selected to initiate probing for cyberattacks or the generation of a j-th steady-state meeting
the conditions above is not possible, go to Step 3.
3. If x̃b,j(tk) ∈ Ωρ′e,1 , go to Step 3a. Else, go to Step 3b.
(a) Compute a control action for the subsequent sampling period with Eq. 9f of the 1-LEMPC
activated. Go to Step 6.
(b) Compute a control action for the subsequent sampling period with Eq. 9g of the 1-
LEMPC activated. Go to Step 6.
4. The j-LEMPC receives the state measurement x̃b,j(tk) and controls the process according to
Eq. 10. Evaluate the Lyapunov function throughout the sampling period. If Vj does not
decrease over the sampling period following ts,j, detect that the process is potentially under
a cyberattack and mitigating actions may be applied (e.g., a backup policy such as the use of
redundant sensors or an emergency shut-down mode). Go to Step 5.
5. At te,j, switch back to operation under the 1-LEMPC. Go to Step 6.
6. Go to Step 1 (k ← k + 1).
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Remark 2. Though it is possible to set te,j to a value other than tk+1, this may have several
disadvantages: 1) it would cause the process to operate under a control law that is not the desired
control law for normal operation for a longer period of time, potentially impacting prots; and 2) if
the LEMPC of Eq. 10 is applied for a sucient number of sampling periods, the closed-loop state
would enter a neighborhood Ωρ′s,j in which the value of Vj is no longer guaranteed to decrease. This
could obscure the detection mechanism.
Remark 3. Both the random switching to and the generation of the j-LEMPC's are considered
helpful. If, for example, only the time of switching was randomized (i.e., there were only a 1-LEMPC
and a 2-LEMPC which could be activated at random times), an attacker may learn which control
laws are possible and subsequently attempt to provide false state measurements that indicate that
both V1 and V2 decrease over time so that regardless of whether the 1 or 2-LEMPC is activated, the
attack is not detected via the probing mechanism. If the switching time was not fully randomized
(e.g., probing was only performed when it would be less impactful on the economics than probing
would be from another state), this would also add a level of determinism to the policy that has
potential to be exploited by an attacker.
Randomized LEMPC Changes to Probe for Cyberattacks: Stability and Feasibility Analysis
In this section, we prove recursive feasibility and closed-loop stability of the process of Eq. 1
under the LEMPC of Eqs. 9-10. The impacts of bounded process noise and disturbances on the
process state trajectory are characterized in Proposition 1 below, and Proposition 2 provides a
bound on the value of the Lyapunov function evaluated at dierent points in the stability region.
Proposition 1. 21,20 Consider the systems below
ẋb,j = fj(xb,j(t), uj(t), w(t)) (11a)
˙̃xb,j = fj(x̃b,j(t), uj(t), 0) (11b)
with initial states |xb,j(t0)− x̃b,j(t0)| ≤ δ with t0 = 0. If xb,j(t), x̃b,j(t) ∈ Ωρj for t ∈ [0, T ], then there
exists a function fW,j(·, ·) such that:
|xb,j(t)− x̃b,j(t)| ≤ fW,j(δ, t− t0) (12)
11










Proposition 2. 21Consider the Lyapunov function Vj(·) of the nominal system of Eq. 1, in deviation
variable form from the j-th steady-state, under the controller hj(·) that satises Eqs. 2a-2d and 3
for the model of Eq. 1 in deviation variable form from the j-th steady-state. There exists a quadratic
function fVj(·) such that:
Vj(x̄) ≤ Vj(x̄′) + fVj(|x̄− x̄′|) (14)





where Mv,j is a positive constant.
The following theorem guarantees closed-loop stability of the process of Eq. 1 under the imple-
mentation strategy of Section Randomized LEMPC Changes to Probe for Cyberattacks: Imple-
mentation Strategy when no cyberattack occurs (i.e., with probing, but no attacks, so that the
maximum value of δ in Proposition 1 would be θ′v, where θ
′
v represents the value of θv,i for Eq. 6
when yi(t) = x(t) (i.e., for full state measurement)).
Theorem 1. Consider the closed-loop system of Eq. 1 under the implementation strategy of Section
Randomized LEMPC Changes to Probe for Cyberattacks: Implementation Strategy and in the
absence of a false sensor measurement cyberattack where each controller hi(·), i ≥ 1, used in each
i-LEMPC meets the inequalities in Eqs. 2a-2d and 3 with respect to the i-th dynamic model. Let
ϵWi > 0, ∆ > 0, N ≥ 1, Ωρj ⊂ Ωρsamp2,1 ⊂ Ωρ1 ⊂ X1 for j > 1, ρj > ρh,j > ρmin,j > ρs,j > ρ′s,j > 0,
where Ωρh,j is dened as a level set of Ωρj that guarantees that if Vj(x̃b,j(tk)) ≤ ρh,j, Vj(xb,j(tk)) ≤ ρj,
and ρ1 > ρsamp2,1 > ρsamp,1 > ρ
′
e,1 > ρmin,1 > ρs,1 > ρ
′
s,1 > 0, where Ωρsamp,1 is dened as a level set
of Ωρ1 where if xb,1(tk) ∈ Ωρ1/Ωρsamp,1, x̃b,1(tk) ∈ Ωρ1/Ωρ′e,1, satisfy:
−α3,i(α−12,i (ρ′s,i)) + L′x,iMf,i∆ ≤ −ϵw,i/∆, i = 1, 2, . . . (16)
ρ′e,1 + fV,1(fW,1(δ,∆)) ≤ ρsamp2,1 (17)
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−α3,1(α−12,1(ρ′e,1)) + L′x,1Mf,1∆+ L′x,1δ + L′w,1θw ≤ −ϵ′w,1/∆ (18)
−α3,j(α−12,j (ρs,j)) + L′x,jMf,j∆+ L′x,jδ + L′w,jθw ≤ −ϵ′w,j/∆, j = 1, 2, 3, . . . (19)
ρmin,i = max{Vi(xb,i(t+∆)) : xb,i(t) ∈ Ωρ′s,i}, i = 1, 2, . . . (20)
ρsamp2,1 ≥ max{V1(xb,1(t+∆)) : xb,1(t) ∈ Ωρsamp,1/Ωρ′e,1} (21)
ρ1 ≥ max{V1(x̃b,1(tk)) : xb,1(tk) ∈ Ωρsamp2,1} (22)
ρj ≥ max{Vj(x̃b,1(tk)) : x̃b,j(tk) ∈ Ωρh,j}, j = 2, 3, . . . (23)
ρ′s,i < min{Vi(xb,i(tk)) : x̃b,i(tk) ∈ Ωρs,i}, i = 1, 2, . . . (24)
If x̃b,1(t0) ∈ Ωρsamp2,1, xb,1(t0) ∈ Ωρsamp2,1, and |x̃b,i(tk)−xb,i(tk)| ≤ δ, k = 0, 1 . . ., then the closed-loop
state is maintained in Ωρsamp2,1 and the state measurement is in Ωρ1 when the 1-LEMPC is activated
at t0 and for te,j−1 ≤ t < ts,j, or when the j-LEMPC is activated for ts,j ≤ t < te,j under the
implementation strategy of Section Randomized LEMPC Changes to Probe for Cyberattacks: Im-
plementation Strategy, and the closed-loop state and the state measurement are maintained within
Ωρ1 for t ≥ 0. Furthermore, in the sampling period after ts,j, if x̃b,j(tk) ∈ Ωρj/Ωρs,j , Vj decreases
and x(t) ∈ Ωρj for t ∈ [tk, tk+1).
Proof. The proof consists of ve parts. In the rst part, recursive feasibility at every sampling time
under the implementation strategy is demonstrated. In the second part, it is demonstrated that the
closed-loop state and state measurement are maintained within Ωρ1 when the 1-LEMPC is used.
In the third part, it is shown that the closed-loop state and state measurement are maintained
within Ωρj when the j-LEMPC is used under the implementation strategy of Section Randomized
LEMPC Changes to Probe for Cyberattacks: Implementation Strategy. In the fourth part, it is
demonstrated that the closed-loop state and state measurement are always contained within Ωρ1
under the proposed implementation strategy. Finally, in the fth part, it is shown that in the
sampling period after ts,j, Vj decreases.
Part 1. Both the LEMPC of Eq. 9 and that of Eq. 10 must be feasible whenever they are
activated according to the implementation strategy of Section Randomized LEMPC Changes to
Probe for Cyberattacks: Implementation Strategy. For both, hj implemented in sample-and-hold
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is a feasible input policy. Specically, when the 1-LEMPC is activated, the closed-loop state is in
Ωρ1 , as will be proven below (Part 2). h1 meets Eq. 9e from Eq. 2d and trivially satises Eq. 9g.
Under the conditions in Eqs. 16 and 20, h1 satises Eq. 9f if x̃b,1(tk) ∈ Ωρ124 (and thereby Eq. 9d
since Ωρ1 ⊂ X1). Specically, from Eq. 2b:
∂V1(x̃b,1(tp))
∂x
f1(x̃b,1(tp), h1(x̃b,1(tp)), 0) ≤ −α3,1(|x̃b,1(tp)|), p = k, . . . , k +N − 1 (25)
Therefore, for t ∈ [tp, tp+1) and p = k, . . . , k +N − 1 and x̃b,1(tp) ∈ Ωρ′e,1/Ωρ′s,1 :
∂V1(x̃b,1(t))
∂x
f1(x̃b,1(t), h1(x̃b,1(tp)), 0) ≤ −α3,1(α−12,1(ρ′s,1)) + L′x,1Mf,1∆ (26)







f1(x̃b,1(t), h1(x̃b,1(tp)), 0) and applying the triangle inequality, and subsequently
using Eqs. 2a, 4b, and 5. If Eq. 16 holds,
∂V1(x̃b,1(t))
∂x
f1(x̃b,1(t), h1(x̃b,1(tp)), 0) is negative such that
V1(t) ≤ V1(tp) for t ∈ [tp, tp+1) so that if x̃b,1(tp) ∈ Ωρ′e,1 , then x̃b,1(t) ∈ Ωρ′e,1 , ∀ t ∈ [tp, tp+1). If
instead x̃b,1(tp) ∈ Ωρ′s,1 , then from Eq. 20 and ρ
′
e,1 > ρmin,1 > ρs,1 > ρ
′
s,1, x̃b,1(t) ∈ Ωρmin,1 ⊂ Ωρ′e,1 for
t ∈ [tp, tp+1), as required by the constraint of Eq. 9f.
When instead the LEMPC utilized at a sampling time is the j-LEMPC of Eq. 10, the implemen-
tation strategy of Section Randomized LEMPC Changes to Probe for Cyberattacks: Implementa-
tion Strategy requires that x̃b,j(tk) ∈ Ωρh,j ⊂ Ωρj and xb,j(tk) ∈ Ωρj . Through the same arguments
as for the 1-LEMPC (except that there is no constraint of the form of Eq. 9f), hj in sample-and-hold
is a feasible solution to Eq. 10.
Part 2. To demonstrate the case when the 1-LEMPC is used, we divide the proof into four
cases: Case 1) the actual process state at t0 (xb,1(t0)) is xb,1(t0) ∈ Ωρ′e,1 and the state measurement
at t0 (i.e., x̃b,1(t0)) is x̃b,1(t0) ∈ Ωρ′e,1 ; Case 2) xb,1(t0) ∈ Ωρsamp2,1/Ωρ′e,1 and x̃b,1(t0) ∈ Ωρ1/Ωρ′e,1 ; Case
3) xb,1(t0) ∈ Ωρsamp,1/Ωρ′e,1 but x̃b,1(t0) ∈ Ωρ′e,1 ; and Case 4) xb,1(t0) ∈ Ωρ′e,1 but x̃b,1(t0) ∈ Ωρ1/Ωρ′e,1 .
Part 2 Case 1. If the state measurement used by the LEMPC is x̃b,1(t0) ∈ Ωρ′e,1 , from Eq. 9f,
V1(x̃b,1(t1)) ≤ ρ′e,1. From Propositions 1 and 2, if xb,1(t1) ∈ Ωρsamp2,1 , then:
V1(xb,1(t1)) ≤ V1(x̃b,1(t1)) + fV,1(|x̃b,1(t1)− xb,1(t1)|) ≤ ρ′e,1 + fV,1(fW,1(δ,∆)) (27)
The assumption that xb,1(t1) ∈ Ωρsamp2,1 then follows from Eq. 17.
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1(t0), 0) ≤ −α3,1(|x̃b,1(t0)|) (28)
where u∗i (t0) is the optimal solution of the i-LEMPC at t0. The time derivative of V1 along the





1(t0), w(τ)) ≤ −α3,1(α−12,1(ρ′e,1)) + L′x,1Mf,1∆+ L′x,1δ + L′w,1θw (29)










1(t0), w(τ)) and using Eq. 28, the triangle inequality, the denition of x̃b,1(t0),
Eq. 5, Eq. 2a, and the fact that x̃b,1(t0) ∈ Ωρ1/Ωρ′e,1 . If Eq. 18 holds, then V̇1(xb,1(τ)) ≤ −ϵ
′
w,1/∆
for τ ∈ [t0, t1), so that V1(xb,1(t)) ≤ V1(xb,1(t0)), ∀ t ∈ [t0, t1), and thus xb,1(t) ∈ Ωρsamp2,1 .
Part 2 Case 3. If xb,1(t0) ∈ Ωρsamp,1/Ωρ′e,1 , then from Eq. 21, V1(xb,1(t)) ≤ ρsamp2,1, ∀ t ∈ [t0, t1).
Part 2 Case 4. If the actual state xb,1(t0) ∈ Ωρ′e,1 and the state measurement x̃b,1(t0) ∈ Ωρ1/Ωρ′e,1
is provided to the LEMPC, Eq. 9g is enforced. From the proof for Case 2, this causes V1(xb,1(t)) ≤
V1(xb,1(t0)), ∀ t ∈ [t0, t1) if Eq. 18 holds and xb,1(t0) ∈ Ωρ′e,1/Ωρs,1 , such that V1(xb,1(t)) ≤ ρsamp2,1,
∀ t ∈ [t0, t1). If xb,1(t0) ∈ Ωρ′s,1 , then xb,1(t) ∈ Ωρmin,1 ⊂ Ωρsamp2,1 , for t ∈ [t0, t1), from Eq. 20.
Part 2 Cases 2-4 indicate that if xb,1(t0) ∈ Ωρsamp2,1 , then xb,1(t) ∈ Ωρsamp2,1 for t ∈ [t0, t1).
Applying this recursively, xb,1 stays within Ωρsamp2,1 throughout the time period that the 1-LEMPC
is used. Then, Eq. 22 indicates that the state measurement is always in Ωρ1 .
Part 3. When the j-LEMPC is used (for j > 1) (i.e., x̃b,j(tk) must be in Ωρh,j ⊂ Ωρj ⊂ Ωρsamp2,1
with xb,j(tk) ∈ Ωρj by the implementation strategy of Section Randomized LEMPC Changes to
Probe for Cyberattacks: Implementation Strategy and Eq. 23), if x̃b,j(tk) ∈ Ωρh,j/Ωρs,j , j > 1 (as
required in Section Randomized LEMPC Changes to Probe for Cyberattacks: Implementation
Strategy), is the state measurement used by the LEMPC according to the implementation strategy
of Section Randomized LEMPC Changes to Probe for Cyberattacks: Implementation Strategy,





j(tk), 0) ≤ −α3,j(|x̃b,j(tk)|) (30)
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Following a similar procedure as in Part 2 Case 2, the time derivative of Vj along the closed-loop





j(tk), w(τ)) ≤ −α3,j(α−12,j (ρs,j)) + L′x,jMf,j∆+ L′x,jδ + L′w,jθw (31)










j(tk), w(τ)) and using Eq. 30, the triangle inequality, the denition of x̃b,j(tk),
Eq. 5, Eq. 2a, and the fact that xb,j(tk) ∈ Ωρh,j/Ωρs,j with the contractive constraint of Eq. 10f
always activated and Eq. 24. If Eq. 19 holds, then V̇j(xb,j(τ)) ≤ −ϵ′w,j/∆ for τ ∈ [tk, tk+1), so that
Vj(xb,j(t)) ≤ Vj(xk), ∀ t ∈ [tk, tk+1), and thus xb,j(t) ∈ Ωρj ⊂ Ωρsamp2,1 .
Part 4. To demonstrate that the closed-loop state is always maintained within Ωρsamp2,1 and
that the measurement is always contained in Ωρ1 under the implementation strategy of Section
Randomized LEMPC Changes to Probe for Cyberattacks: Implementation Strategy, we proceed
by induction. Consider rst the conditions at t0. At t0, x(t0) ∈ Ωρsamp2,1 , and Eq. 22 guarantees
that the state measurement is within Ωρ1 . Part 2 guarantees that x(t1) ∈ Ωρsamp2,1 and that the
state measurement at t1 is within Ωρ1 once again. At tk, k > 0, either the 1-LEMPC (if Eq. 9 is
activated) or a j-LEMPC (if Eq. 10 is randomly selected to be activated) is used. If the 1-LEMPC
is used, Part 2 guarantees that xb,j(tk+1) ∈ Ωρsamp2,1 and that the measurement at tk+1 is contained
in Ωρ1 . If instead the j-LEMPC is used, then xb,j(tk) ∈ Ωρj ⊂ Ωρsamp2,1 or else the implementation
strategy of Section Randomized LEMPC Changes to Probe for Cyberattacks: Implementation
Strategy would not have allowed the use of the j-LEMPC. When xb,j(tk) ∈ Ωρj ⊂ Ωρsamp2,1 (by the
conditions of the implementation strategy in Section Randomized LEMPC Changes to Probe for
Cyberattacks: Implementation Strategy), Part 3 above guarantees that xb,j(t) ∈ Ωρj ⊂ Ωρsamp2,1 ,
∀ t ∈ [t0, t1] and that the measurement is in Ωρj ⊂ Ωρsamp2,1 , which is also a subset of Ωρ1 by the
assumptions of the theorem. Therefore, at t0, regardless of whether the 1-LEMPC or the j-LEMPC
is activated, the closed-loop state is still within Ωρsamp2,1 and the state measurement is within Ωρ1
throughout the subsequent sampling period and at the subsequent sampling time. Applying this
recursively indicates that the closed-loop state and state measurement are contained within Ωρsamp2,1
and Ωρ1 , respectively, at all times.
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Part 5. Finally, we demonstrate that Vj, j > 1, decreases in a sampling period after ts,j
by noting that the implementation strategy of Section Randomized LEMPC Changes to Probe
for Cyberattacks: Implementation Strategy requires that the j-LEMPC only be activated if the
actual state is within Ωρj/Ωρ′s,j (i.e., the measurement is within Ωρh,j/Ωρs,j , where Ωρs,j satises
Eq. 24 and Ωρh,j satises Eq. 23). This ensures that the actual value of the state is outside of
Ωρ′s,j and within Ωρj . Therefore, because Eq. 19 holds for xb,j(tk) ∈ Ωρj/Ωρ′s,j , the value of Vj will
decrease for t ∈ [tk, tk+1).
Remark 4. A number of regions are dened in the above theorem. Ωρi , i = 1, 2, . . . has been
described as an invariant set in which it is desired to maintain the closed-loop state and state
estimates, and Ωρ′e,1 is a region used in dierentiating between whether Eq. 9f or 9g is used in
Eq. 9). Ωρmin,i , i = 1, 2, . . ., is dened via Eq. 20 as the maximum value of Vi evaluated for the
actual state that can be reached within a sampling period if the actual state is within Ωρ′s,i at a
sampling time, and any input in the input bounds is applied to the system. Ωρsamp,1 is dened as a
region where, if the actual closed-loop state is within this region at a sampling time, the maximum
distance that the closed-loop state would be able to go within a sampling period is into Ωρsamp2,1 .
Ωρsamp,1 is important to characterize due to the presence of measurement noise; specically, in the
presence of measurement noise, there may be some range of states outside of Ωρ′e,1 where it is still
possible that with |x̃b,j(tk)−xb,j(tk)| < δ, the measured state may be within Ωρ′e,1 . In this case, under
the 1-LEMPC, the constraint of Eq. 9f would be activated, though if the true state measurement
was known, the constraint of Eq. 9g would be activated. To prevent this discrepancy from leading
to closed-loop stability issues, Ωρsamp,1 is dened as a region within Ωρ1 where with the bound δ on
the dierence between the actual and measured values of the state, the measured state could still
be within Ωρ′e,1 . Ωρsamp2,1 is then dened to be within Ωρ1 so that the maximum distance that the
closed-loop state could travel when the state measurement is within Ωρ′e,1 but the actual state is
outside of it is still within Ωρ1 . Not only is the actual state then dened to be within Ωρ1 when the
actual state is within Ωρsamp2,1 , but the state measurement is then also required to be within Ωρ1
(Eq. 22). Furthermore, because Eqs. 9g and 10f only enforce a decrease condition on Vj, j = 2, 3, . . .,
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when the closed-loop state is within Ωρj/Ωρ′s,j , the implementation strategy of Section Randomized
LEMPC Changes to Probe for Cyberattacks: Implementation Strategy requires that the actual
value of the closed-loop state be outside of Ωρ′s,j . First, to guarantee that the actual state at tk is
inside Ωρj , we dene the region ρh,j in Eq. 23 as a within Ωρj such that if the state measurement
is within Ωρh,j at tk, the actual state value is inside Ωρj . However, due to measurement noise, the
measured value may be outside of Ωρ′s,j , but the actual state may be within Ωρ′s,j , which could
impact the ability of Vj to decrease over a sampling period following the activation of the constraint
of Eq. 10f. To prevent this, we dene the region Ωρs,j in Eq. 24 such that if the state measurement
is within Ωρs,j at tk, the actual state value is still outside of Ωρ′s,j so that meeting the condition of
Eq. 16 guarantees that Vj will decrease in the following sampling period.
Remark 5. According to the proof above, the LEMPC formulation is designed to account for su-
ciently small disturbances and measurement noise. Therefore, the lack of a decrease in the Lyapunov
function under the proposed control/detection strategy would not be due to plant/model mismatch
or sensor noise if the conditions of Theorem 1 are met. Furthermore, if Vj does not decrease over a
sampling period after ts,j when computed using the sensor measurements, this strategy detects the
attack even if all sensors are compromised.
Remark 6. If the control law is changed at a sampling period, the attacker may try to detect
this and determine which control law a given control action throughout a sampling period could
have been derived from to attempt to ensure that the false state measurement that they provide
at the beginning of the next sampling period causes the expected behavior of Vj. However, since
the control action is being implemented in sample-and-hold over the sampling period, there is not
much data on the control law available from u∗i for the attacker then to work from. If the LEMPC
is computing set-points for regulatory controllers, these controllers would not be providing more
information on what control law (i.e., Lyapunov function) the LEMPC used. When measurements
of the state are available more frequently than every sampling period, an attacker may not be able
to falsify all of the measurements immediately after ts,j until they are aware of the change in the
control law, which has potential to reveal the attack if Vj does not decrease for any fraction of
the sampling period after ts,j due to this. However, Detection Strategy 1 has no guarantees that
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it will detect an attack. When an attack occurs, the sensor measurements are falsied, and that
can compromise closed-loop stability before that attack is detected, and may also result in a false
sensor measurement trajectory that happens to decrease Vj. There is no guarantee that a probing
maneuver will be activated at a time when it could reveal an attack. The concept of the method
is that it could be used to ag a false sensor measurement cyberattack if it does not cause Vj to
decrease when it should be.
Remark 7. The worst-case rate at which Vj will decrease over a sampling period following activation
of the j-LEMPC could be slow, in which case a practical sensor may not register the decrease in
the value of the Lyapunov function even if it is occurring. Therefore, from a practical perspective,
there could be cases where a suciently long period of time might be needed for the decrease in
the Lyapunov function to be registered by a practical sensing device, and that amount of time may
or may not be equivalent to one sampling period after the probing mechanism is triggered.
Randomized LEMPC Changes to Probe for Cyberattacks: Chemical Process Example
In this section, a chemical process example is used to demonstrate the implementation of Detec-
tion Strategy 1, as well as to highlight the limitation of this method in that it is not guaranteed to
detect attacks. The nonlinear process model consists of a continuous stirred tank reactor (CSTR)




















where the states are the reactant concentration of species A and temperature in the reactor (CA
and T , respectively). The manipulated inputs are CA0 (the reactant feed concentration of species
A) and the heat rate Q. The values of the parameters of the CSTR model (F , V , k0, E, Rg,
T0, ρL, ∆H, and Cp) are taken from.
25 The vectors of deviation variables for the states and
inputs from their operating steady-state values, x1s = [CAs Ts]
T = [1.22 kmol/m3 438.2 K]T ,
[CA0s Qs]
T = [4.0 kmol/m3 0 kJ/h]T , respectively, are x1 = [x1,1 x1,2]
T = [CA − CAs T − Ts]T and
u1 = [u1,1 u1,2]
T = [CA0−CA0s Q−Qs]T . The process model represented by Eqs. 32-33 is numerically
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integrated using the explicit Euler method with integration step of 10−4 h. The economic stage
cost is selected to be Le = k0e
−E/(RT )C2A. Despite the simplicity of this case study, it is illustrative
for the cyberattack detection methods without convoluting the results through a more complex
example, and the theoretical results of this work hold in the case of more complex processes.
The controller receives a state measurement subject to bounded measurement noise and the pro-
cess is subject to bounded disturbances. The noise is represented by a standard normal distribution
with mean zero, standard deviations of 0.002 kmol/m3 and 0.5 K, and bounds of 0.002 kmol/m3 and
0.5 K for the concentration of the reactant and reactor temperature, respectively. Process distur-
bances were added to the right-hand side of the dierential equations describing the rates of change
of CA and T with zero mean and standard deviations of 0.5 kmol/m
3 h and 2 K/h, and bounds of 2
kmol/m3 h and 5 K/h, respectively. The baseline LEMPC formulation used Lyapunov-based stabil-
ity constraints were designed using a Lyapunov function V1 = x
T
b,1Pxb,1, where P = [1200 5; 5 0.1].
In the selected Lyapunov-based controller h1(xb,1) = [h1,1(xb,1) h1,2(xb,1)]
T , h1,1(xb,1) was set to 0
kmol/m3 for simplicity and h1,2(xb,1) was designed via Sontag's control law.
26 The stability region
was dened with ρ1 = 300 (i.e., Ωρ1 = {x1 ∈ R2 : V1(xb,1) ≤ ρ1}), and ρ′e,1 = 225. N and ∆ were
set to 10 and 0.01 h, respectively.
The process was simulated for 0.1 h of operation, initialized at x1,init = [x1,1(t0) x1,2(t0)]
T =
[−0.21 kmol/m3 28.89 K]T in MATLAB R2016b using fmincon. In the LEMPC, the value of the
decision variable corresponding to Q was scaled down by 105, and probing was initialized at t0.
Four simulations were performed: two in which the original steady-state and stability region were
utilized for probing (i.e., a constraint of the form of Eq. 10f was enforced at the end of the rst
sampling period, and no constraint of the form in Eq. 9f was used), and two in which a modied
steady-state and stability region were utilized for probing. The modied steady-state (x2s) has a
stability region in Ωρ1 and includes x1,init. Specically, the new steady-state was selected to be
x2s = [1.22 kmol/m
3 450 K]T . The stability region around this new steady-state is dened using
V2(x) = x
T
2 P2x2, where x2 = x1 + x1s − x2s, with P2 = [2100 10; 10 0.25], and ρ2 = 100 (i.e.,
Ωρ2 = {x2 ∈ R2 : V2(x2) ≤ ρ2}). The modied LEMPC design was formulated with respect to x2
and designed using a Lyapunov-based controller with h2,1(xb,2) = 0 kmol/m






















Figure 1: V1 (top plots) and V2 (bottom plots) proles over 0.1 h of operation for the process example in the presence
of dierent cyberattack policies.
using Sontag's control law with respect to V2(xb,2).
Two cyberattacks were simulated on the two dierent probing formulations: 1) Attack 1: A
constant false state measurement x1,1 = 0.1 kmol/m
3, x1,2 = 10 K is provided to the LEMPC's
starting at t0; 2) Attack 2: A false state measurement of the form x1,1 = −0.17 kmol/m3, x1,2 =
8.0 + 0.1r K, with r increasing by one from 1 to 9 at each sampling time until the 9th sampling
time and then keeping r at 9, is provided to the controller starting at t0. The V1(x̃b,1) and V2(x̃b,2)
proles that result when the attacks and probing are both initialized at t0 are presented in Fig. 1.
It can be seen that under Attack 1, whether the value of V1 or V2 is monitored over time, the attack
would be detected, whereas if the probing was only undertaken for a sampling period as suggested
in the theory (it is applied for the entire 0.1 h simulation in Fig. 1), Attack 2 would not be detected
with either probing strategy.
Remark 8. In general with the proposed method, until the probing starts, an LEMPC may not be
driving a process toward the steady-state so that there would not necessarily be a decrease in the
Lyapunov function expected over a sampling period before a probing maneuver.
Detection Strategy 2: Cyberattack-Mitigating State Feedback LEMPC
Detection Strategy 1 described in Section Detection Strategy 1: Randomized LEMPC Changes
to Probe for Cyberattacks may identify a cyberattack by taking advantage of LEMPC's properties,
but it does not guarantee closed-loop stability in the presence of an attack (and as shown in the
example of the prior section, there can be many cases in which the method fails to detect attacks). A
strategy suggested in20,17 could be used instead to give a detection strategy that provides short-term
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guarantees that the closed-loop state is maintained in a bounded region of operation after an attack
on the sensor measurements (even, potentially, all of the measurements). Specically, this second
detection strategy uses state predictions from the process model from the last state measurement to
identify an attack if the predictions deviate too signicantly from the measurements. When the norm
of the dierence between the state measurement and the state prediction is above a threshold, the
measurement is agged as a possible sensor attack. When the dierence is below a threshold, then
even if the measurement was falsied, the closed-loop state can be maintained in Ωρ1 for a sampling
period after the attack if the process is operated under an LEMPC with a suciently conservative
design (if the attack is not detected at tk, an auxiliary detection mechanism (e.g., machine learning
detection methods3) could be used in addition to attempt to identify a cyberattack on the sensor
measurements to avoid the potential that the closed-loop state may leave Ωρ1 after tk+1). The
developments below will focus on the case that the 1-LEMPC of Eq. 9 is used to control the process
at all times.
Cyberattack-Mitigating State Feedback LEMPC: Implementation Strategy
The implementation strategy for this detection/control method is as follows, where x̃b,1(tk|tk−1)
denotes the prediction of the state x̃b,1 at tk evaluated by integrating the dynamic model of Eq. 9b
from a measurement at tk−1 until tk:
1. At sampling time tk, if |x̃b,1(tk|tk−1)− x̃b,1(tk|tk)| > ν, detect that a cyberattack is occurring
and go to Step 1a. Else, go to Step 1b.
(a) Apply a backup strategy or enter an emergency shut-down mode.
(b) Operate the process under the LEMPC of Eq. 9 while employing an auxiliary detection
mechanism to attempt to ag any un-detected attack at tk. tk ← tk+1. Go to Step 1.
Cyberattack-Mitigating State Feedback LEMPC: Stability and Feasibility Analysis
The following theorem guarantees that in the presence of bounded measurement noise and distur-
bances, the implementation strategy of Section Cyberattack-Mitigating State Feedback LEMPC:
Implementation Strategy maintains the closed-loop state within Ωρ1 before an attack occurs and
for at least one sampling period after the attack.
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Theorem 2. 20 Consider the system of Eq. 1 in closed-loop under the implementation strategy
of Section Cyberattack-Mitigating State Feedback LEMPC: Implementation Strategy based on a
controller h1(·) that satises the assumptions of Eqs. 2a-2d and 3. Let the conditions of Theorem 1
hold with ts,j = ∞, j = 2, 3, . . ., and δ ≥ fW,1(θ′v,∆) + ν. If x̃b,1(t0) ∈ Ωρsamp2,1 ⊂ Ωρ1 and
xb,1(t0) ∈ Ωρsamp2,1, then xb,1(t) ∈ Ωρsamp2,1 and the state measurement at each sampling time is in
Ωρ1 for all times before a sampling time tA that a cyberattack falsies a state measurement, and
xb,1(t) ∈ Ωρsamp2,1 for t ∈ [tA, tA +∆), if the attack is not detected at tA.
Proof. Theorem 1 guarantees that x̃b,1(t) ∈ Ωρ1 and xb,1(t) ∈ Ωρsamp2,1 for t < tA. To prove that
xb,1(t) ∈ Ωρsamp2,1 for t ∈ [tA, tA + ∆), consider the measurements x̃b,1(tk−1|tk−1) and x̃b,1(tk|tk),
and the predicted state x̃b,1(t|tk−1) from the nominal model of Eq. 9b for t ∈ [tk−1, tk]. From the
bounded measurement noise assumption, |x̃b,1(tk−1|tk−1)− xb,1(tk−1)| ≤ θ′v. Proposition 1 gives:
|xb,1(tk)− x̃b,1(tk|tk−1)| ≤ fW,1(θ′v,∆) (34)
If an attack is not agged at tk:
|xb,1(tk)− x̃b,1(tk|tk)| ≤ |xb,1(tk)− x̃b,1(tk|tk−1) + x̃b,1(tk|tk−1)− x̃b,1(tk|tk)|
≤ fW,1(θ′v,∆) + |x̃b,1(tk|tk−1)− x̃b,1(tk|tk)| ≤ fW,1(θ′v,∆) + ν
(35)
where the last inequality follows from the fact that the implementation strategy would have agged
the attack at tk if |x̃b,1(tk|tk−1) − x̃b,1(tk|tk)| > ν. Finally, when δ in Theorem 1 satises δ ≥
fW,1(θ
′
v,∆)+ν, then the closed-loop state is maintained within Ωρsamp2,1 over the subsequent sampling
period according to the proof of Theorem 1 if there is an attack at tk.
Remark 9. One could consider employing Detection Strategy 1 as an auxiliary detection mechanism
with Detection Strategy 2 if the j-LEMPC is activated at the beginning of one of the sampling
periods over which closed-loop stability is still maintained after an attack (but Detection Strategy
1 is not guaranteed to detect the attack).
Remark 10. The value of the threshold ν is a design decision that should be specied considering
Eq. 35 and the conditions of Theorem 1. Specically, larger values of ν require a more conservative
stability region. However, overly conservative values could cause false alarms, since there is some
dierence between the state measurement and state prediction due to noise and disturbances.
23
Detection Strategy 3: Cyberattack-Resilient Output Feedback LEMPC
Detection Strategy 2 ensures that the closed-loop state is maintained in Ωρ1 for only one sampling
period after an attack occurs. Detection Strategy 3, which guarantees that the closed-loop state is
maintained in a bounded region of operation for all time, uses multiple redundant state estimators
(where at least one cannot be impacted by the false sensor measurements) coupled with an output
feedback LEMPC. This method extends the results in19 by considering that multiple state estimators
may be impacted by a cyberattack.
Cyberattack-Resilient Output Feedback LEMPC: Formulation
The output feedback LEMPC design used for this detection strategy is formulated to receive a
state estimate z1 from one of the redundant state estimators (the estimator used to provide state
estimates to the LEMPC will be denoted as the i = 1 estimator) at tk. The notation follows that
of Eq. 8 with Eq. 8c replaced by x̃(tk) = z1(tk); we will subsequently refer to this LEMPC as the
output feedback LEMPC of Eq. 8.
Detection Strategy 3 guarantees that any cyberattacks which would drive the closed-loop state
out of Ωρ will be detected before this occurs. It recognizes cyberattacks by agging deviations of the
state estimates from normal behavior; however, as normal behavior includes both measurement
noise and disturbances (Eqs. 1 and 6), care must be taken in setting the threshold on the state
estimate deviation from a normal value to avoid false detections. With slight abuse of notation
compared to that used in describing Detection Strategies 1 and 2, we here revert to the use of x(t)
(rather than xb,j(t))) to denote the actual state at time t. We consider that at least one of the
M state estimators is not aected by false state measurements (i.e., up to M − 1 state estimators
are receiving measurements for which at least some subset of them are falsied). To determine a
threshold, we note that the bounds in Assumption 2 imply that the following holds:
|zi(t)− zj(t)| = |zi(t)− x(t) + x(t)− zj(t)| ≤ |zi(t)− x(t)|+ |zj(t)− x(t)|
≤ ϵij := (e∗mi + e∗mj) ≤ ϵmax := max{ϵij}
(36)
for all i ̸= j, i = 1, . . . ,M , j = 1, . . . ,M , as long as t ≥ tq = max{tb1, . . . , tbM}. Therefore,
abnormal behavior can be detected if |zi(tk)− zj(tk)| > ϵmax if tk > tq (this avoids false detections).
In practice, it may not be possible to know the numbers e∗mi and e
∗
mj, as they can only be known
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by knowing an upper bound on how far o each zi(t) is from x(t), which may not be known since
full state feedback may not be available. By using Eq. 36 with data from an attack-free scenario,
a bound may be able to be placed on the possible value of ϵmax based on how far apart zi(t) and
zj(t) are over time. In the following, we will assume that the upper bound ϵmax can be determined.
Cyberattack-Resilient Output Feedback LEMPC: Implementation Strategy
This implementation strategy assumes that the process has already been run successfully in the
absence of attacks under the output feedback LEMPC of Eq. 8 for some time such that |zi(t)−x(t)| ≤
ϵ∗mi for all i = 1, . . . ,M before an attack:
1. At sampling time tk, if |zi(tk) − zj(tk)| > ϵmax, i = 1, . . . ,M , j = 1, . . . ,M , or z1(tk) /∈
Ωρ (where z1 is the state estimate used in the EMPC design), detect that a cyberattack is
occurring and go to Step 1a. Else, go to Step 1b.
(a) Enter an emergency shut-down mode that no longer operates the process under the
output feedback LEMPC of Eq. 8.
(b) Operate using the output feedback LEMPC of Eq. 8. tk ← tk+1. Go to Step 1.
Cyberattack-Resilient Output Feedback LEMPC: Stability and Feasibility Analysis
This section details feasibility and closed-loop stability results for systems of Eq. 1 under the
implementation strategy of Section Cyberattack-Resilient Output Feedback LEMPC: Implemen-
tation Strategy. We rst present a proposition that bounds the worst-case dierence between the
state estimate used by the output feedback LEMPC of Eq. 8 and the actual value of the process
state under the implementation strategy when an attack is not agged.
Proposition 3. Consider the system of Eq. 1 under the implementation strategy of Section
Cyberattack-Resilient Output Feedback LEMPC: Implementation Strategy where M > 1 state es-
timators develop independent estimates of the process state and at least one of these estimators is
not impacted by false state measurements being provided to the estimators (and the attacks do not
begin until after tq). If a false sensor measurement cyberattack is not agged at tk according to
the implementation strategy, then the worst-case dierence between z1 and the actual state x(tk) is
given by:
|z1(tk)− x(tk)| ≤ ϵ∗M := ϵmax +max{e∗mj}, j = 1, . . . ,M (37)
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Proof. Two cases must be considered: Case 1) z1 is not impacted by the attack; Case 2) z1 is
impacted by the attack.
Case 1. When z1 is not impacted by an attack, |z1(tk) − x(tk)| is given by Assumption 2 for
tk > tq. Specically, Eq. 37 holds since:
|z1(tk)− x(tk)| ≤ e∗m1 ≤ ϵmax +max(e∗mj) = ϵ∗M (38)
Case 2. When z1 is impacted by an attack but at least one of the other estimators (with its
estimate denoted as z2) is not, the following upper bound can be developed:
|z1(tk)− x(tk)| = |z1(tk)− z2(tk) + z2(tk)− x(tk)| ≤ |z1(tk)− z2(tk)|+ |z2(tk)− x(tk)|
≤ ϵmax +max(e∗mj) = ϵ∗M , j = 1, . . . ,M
(39)
where the last inequality follows from the fact that the detection algorithm was not activated (i.e.,
|z1(tk)− z2(tk)| ≤ ϵmax) and the assumption that the estimator producing z2 is not impacted by the
false sensor measurements (i.e., |z2(tk)− x(tk)| ≤ max(e∗mj)), according to Assumption 2).
Theorem 3 below summarizes the stability properties of the system of Eq. 1 operated under the
proposed implementation strategy in Section Cyberattack-Resilient Output Feedback LEMPC: Im-
plementation Strategy. This theorem re-purposes a bound on the allowable error in a state estimate
supplied to an output feedback-based LEMPC in the absence of cyberattacks from.22,21 Specically,
the proposed cyberattack detection method enables the bound in Eq. 37 to be dened, which allows
cyberattacks to be treated in the framework previously developed in22,21 for guaranteeing closed-
loop stability of output feedback LEMPC in the presence of measurement noise and disturbances,
and thereby allows the combined detection and control framework to guarantee closed-loop stability
when a cyberattack is not agged according to the proposed methodology.
Theorem 3. Consider the system of Eq. 1 in closed-loop under the LEMPC of Eq. 8 based on an
observer and controller pair satisfying Assumptions 1-2 and formulated with respect to the i = 1
measurement vector, and formulated with respect to a controller h(·) that meets Eqs. 2a-2d and 3.
Let the conditions of Proposition 3 hold, and θw ≤ θ∗w, θv,i ≤ θ∗v,i, ϵi ∈ (ϵ∗Li, ϵ∗Ui), and |zi(t0)−x(t0)| ≤
em0i, for i = 1, . . . ,M . Also, let ϵW,1 > 0, ∆ > 0, Ωρ ⊂ X, and ρ > ρmax > ρ1,1 > ρe,1 > ρmin,1 >
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ρs,1 > 0, satisfy:
ρe,1 ≤ ρmax −max{fV (fW (ϵ∗M ,∆)),Mf max{tz1,∆}α4(α−11 (ρmax))} (40)
ρe,1 ≤ ρ− fV (fW (ϵ∗M ,∆))− fV (ϵ∗M) (41)
− α3(α−12 (ρs,1)) + L′x(Mf∆+ ϵ∗M) + L′wθw ≤ −ϵW,1/∆ (42)
ρmin,1 = max{V (x(t+∆))|V (x(t)) ≤ ρs,1} (43)
ρmin,1 + fV (fW (ϵ
∗
M ,∆)) ≤ ρ (44)
ρmax + fV (ϵ
∗
M) ≤ ρ (45)
where tz1 is the rst sampling time after tb1, and fV and fW are dened as in Propositions 1 and 2
but with the subscripts dropped. Then, if x(t0) ∈ Ωρe,1, x(t) ∈ Ωρmax for all t ≥ 0 and z1(th) ∈ Ωρ
for th ≥ max{∆, tz1} until a cyberattack is detected according to the implementation strategy in
Section Cyberattack-Resilient Output Feedback LEMPC: Implementation Strategy, if the attack
occurs after tq.
Proof. The proof consists of four parts. In Part 1, feasibility of the output feedback LEMPC of
Eq. 8 is proven when z1(tk) ∈ Ωρ. In Part 2, we prove that the closed-loop state trajectory is
contained in Ωρmax for t ∈ [t0,max{∆, tz1}). In Part 3, we prove that for t ≥ max{∆, tz1} but
before an attack occurs, x(t) is bounded within Ωρmax and z1(t) is bounded within Ωρ. In Part 4,
we prove that if there is an attack at tk but it is not detected using the proposed methodology (i.e.,
|zi(t) − zj(t)| ≤ ϵmax, for all i = 1, . . . ,M , j = 1, . . . ,M), x(t) is bounded in Ωρmax and z1(t) is
bounded in Ωρ.
Part 1. The Lyapunov-based controller h(x) implemented in sample-and-hold is a feasible so-
lution to the output feedback LEMPC of Eq. 8 when x̃(tk) = z1(tk) ∈ Ωρ. Specically, h(x(tp)),
p = k, . . . , k + N − 1, t ∈ [tp, tp+1), is a feasible solution to the output feedback LEMPC of Eq. 8
because it meets the input constraints of Eq. 8e according to Eq. 2, it meets the state constraints
of Eq. 8d when x̃(t) ∈ Ωρ ⊂ X, it trivially satises Eq. 8g, and it satises Eq. 8f because the region
Ωρe,1 is forward invariant under h implemented in a sample-and-hold fashion when ρe,1 > ρmin,1, due
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to the closed-loop stability properties of the Lyapunov-based controller (as noted in the proof of
Part 1 for Theorem 1).
Part 2. To demonstrate boundedness of the closed-loop state in Ωρmax for t ∈ [t0,max{∆, tz1}),
the Lyapunov function value can be evaluated as follows:











≤ ρe,1 +Mf max{∆, tz1}α4(α−11 (ρmax))
(46)
for all t ∈ [t0,max{∆, tz1}), where the latter inequality follows from Eq. 2, Eq. 5, and x(t0) ∈
Ωρe,1 ⊂ Ωρ1,1 ⊂ Ωρmax . If ρe,1 is dened as in Eq. 40, then V (x(t)) ≤ ρmax, ∀t ∈ [t0,max{∆, tz1}), so
that x(t) ∈ Ωρmax for all t ∈ [t0,max{∆, tz1}).
Part 3. We now consider the case that t ≥ max{∆, tz1} and the process is not experiencing a
cyberattack (i.e., |zj(tk)−x(tk)| ≤ max(e∗mj), for all j = 1, . . . ,M). In this case, either z1(tk) ∈ Ωρe,1
so that the constraint of Eq. 8f is activated, or z1(tk) ∈ Ωρ/Ωρe,1 so that the constraint of Eq. 8g is
activated. Consider rst the case that z1(tk) ∈ Ωρe,1 . Eq. 8f ensures that x̃(t) is maintained within
Ωρe,1 throughout the prediction horizon, so we must demonstrate that x(t) ∈ Ωρmax and z1(t) ∈ Ωρ
for t ∈ [tk, tk+1). From Proposition 1, we have the following:
|x̃(t)− x(t)| ≤ fW (|z1(tk)− x(tk)|,∆) ≤ fW (ϵ∗M ,∆) (47)
for t ∈ [tk, tk+1), where the last inequality follows from Assumption 2 (i.e., when t ≥ max{∆, tz1}
and before an attack, |z1(tk)− x(tk)| ≤ e∗m1 ≤ ϵ∗M). From Proposition 2:
V (x(t)) ≤ V (x̃(t)) + fV (|x̃(t)− x(t)|) ≤ ρe,1 + fV (fW (ϵ∗M ,∆)) (48)
for t ∈ [tk, tk+1), where the second inequality follows from Eq. 8f and Eq. 47. If Eq. 40 holds, then
if x̃ is maintained in Ωρe,1 , the actual state x(t) is ensured to be inside Ωρmax for t ∈ [tk, tk+1). To
ensure that the estimate for t ∈ [tk, tk+1) is also within Ωρ, Eq. 48 and Proposition 2 give:
V (z1(t)) ≤ V (x(t)) + fV (|x(t)− z1(t)|) ≤ ρe,1 + fV (fW (ϵ∗M ,∆)) + fV (ϵ∗M) (49)
for t ∈ [tk, tk+1). When Eq. 41 holds, Eq. 49 gives that z1(t) ∈ Ωρ for t ∈ [tk, tk+1). Therefore, when
z1(tk) ∈ Ωρe,1 , x(t) is maintained within Ωρmax and z1(t) is maintained in Ωρ for t ∈ [tk, tk+1) if the
conditions of Theorem 3 hold.
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Next, we evaluate the case that z1(tk) ∈ Ωρ/Ωρe,1 (i.e., Eq. 8g is activated). Considering
Eqs. 8g, 2, and 4b, the bound on w, and adding and subtracting the term ∂V (x̃(tk))
∂x
f(x̃(tk), u(tk), 0)
to/from V̇ (x(t)) = ∂V (x(t))
∂x
f(x(t), u(tk), w(t)) and using the triangle inequality, we obtain:
V̇ (x(t)) ≤ −α3(|x̃(tk)|) + L′x|x(t)− x̃(tk)|+ L′wθw (50)
for all x ∈ Ωρ. From |x(t)− x̃(tk)| ≤ |x(t)− x(tk)|+ |x(tk)− x̃(tk)|, we obtain that:
|x(t)− x̃(tk)| ≤ |x(t)− x(tk)|+ ϵ∗M (51)
From Eqs. 5, 51, and 50:
V̇ (x(t)) ≤ −α3(α−12 (ρs,1)) + L′x(Mf∆+ ϵ∗M) + L′wθw (52)
for all x̃ ∈ Ωρ/Ωρs,1 . If the condition of Eq. 42 is satised, Eq. 52 gives:
V (x(t)) ≤ V (x(tk))−
ϵW,1(t− tk)
∆
, t ∈ [tk, tk+1) (53)
Thus, when z1(tk) ∈ Ωρ/Ωρe,1 , if x(tk) ∈ Ωρmax/Ωρs,1 , x(tk+1) ∈ Ωρmax . If instead x(tk) ∈ Ωρs,1 , Eq. 43
guarantees that x(t) ∈ Ωρmin,1 ⊂ Ωρmax for t ∈ [tk, tk+1). From Eq. 49, V (z1(t)) ≤ V (x(t)) + fV (ϵ∗M).
When x(t) ∈ Ωρmax , this gives that V (z1(t)) ≤ ρ if Eq. 45 holds. Applying this recursively indicates
that the closed-loop state is contained within Ωρmax for all times and that the closed-loop state
estimate is inside Ωρ when t ≥ max{∆, tz1}.
Part 4. Finally, we consider the case that at some t ≥ max{∆, tq}, the process is under a false
sensor measurement cyberattack, but it is not detected by the proposed approach (i.e., |zi(tk) −
zj(tk)| ≤ ϵmax for all i = 1, . . . ,M and j = 1, . . . ,M). Since |z1(tk) − x(tk)| ≤ ϵ∗M and the state
estimate is inside Ωρ by the implementation strategy, boundedness of the closed-loop state in Ωρmax
and state estimate in Ωρ are again ensured by Part 3.
Remark 11. Although, the detection conditions have been derived for |zi(tk)− zj(tk)|, i = 1, . . . ,M
and j = 1, . . . ,M , if full state feedback is available, it is possible that one of the redundant estimators
could be replaced by full state feedback (and/or that the resulting full state feedback could be used
in place of z1 in the output feedback LEMPC of Eq. 8). When this is done, the results of this
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section would continue to hold. Specically, following similar steps to those in Section Cyberattack-
Resilient Output Feedback LEMPC: Formulation, we obtain that:
|x̃(tk)− zj(tk)| ≤ |x(tk) + θ′v − zj(tk)| ≤ |x(tk)− zj(tk)|+ θ′v (54)
for j = 2, . . . ,M (if the full state measurement takes the place of z1). Dening ϵmax for this case as
max[max{e∗mj} + θ′v,max{e∗mj + e∗mi}], i = 2, . . . ,M and j = 2, . . . ,M allows the control-theoretic
guarantees of Theorem 3 to hold with this modied ϵmax.
Remark 12. Ultimate boundedness of the closed-loop state of Eq. 1 within Ωρmin,1 can also be
achieved under the LEMPC of Eq. 8 even in the presence of an attack by Part 3 of the proof of
Theorem 3 if the constraint of Eq. 8g begins to be always enforced after a certain time (whereas
this would not be guaranteed in the presence of an attack in Detection Strategies 1 and 2). This is
because not all sensors can be attacked for Detection Strategy 3, so that they eectively act like a
check of one another to prevent a signicant enough deviation of the actual state from the estimate
(i.e., that would prevent stability goals from being achieved) from occurring without detection. The
value of ρmin,1, however, is impacted by the size of ρe,1 (specically, it must be less than ρe,1), which
is impacted by ϵ∗M according to the conditions of Theorem 3, so that if the value of ϵ
∗
M becomes
too large (allowing attacks that cause zi, i = 1, . . . ,M to deviate more signicantly from x to
be allowed), it may become more dicult to nd a value of ρmin,1 that meets the conditions of
Theorem 3.
Remark 13. To determine the number of sensors (and which) that could be attacked while closed-
loop stability is still guaranteed under the implementation strategy until the attack is detected, it
rst must be determined what redundant estimators will be used, and then dierent scenarios with
dierent sensors that could be attacked to cause at least one estimator to not be impacted could
be developed.
Cyberattack-Resilient Output Feedback LEMPC: Chemical Process Example
In this section, a chemical process example is used to illustrate Detection Strategy 3. As in
Section Randomized LEMPC Changes to Probe for Cyberattacks: Chemical Process Example,
we use a nonlinear process model of a CSTR that follows the process dynamics of Eqs. 32-33. The
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process states are the reactant concentration of species A (CA) and temperature in the reactor (T ).
The manipulated input is the reactant feed concentration (CA0). The values of the parameters of
the CSTR model are taken from.27 The vectors of deviation variables for the states and input
from their steady-state values, CAs = 2 kmol/m
3, Ts = 350 K, CA0s = 4.0 kmol/m
3, respectively,
are x = [x1 x2]
T = [CA − CAs T − Ts]T and u = CA0 − CA0s. The process model represented by
Eqs. 32-33 is numerically integrated using the explicit Euler method with integration step of 10−3
h. The economic stage cost Le = k0e
−E/(RT )C2A was utilized for this proposed control/detection
scheme.
Lyapunov-based stability constraints in Eqs. 8f-8g were designed using a quadratic Lyapunov
function V = xTPx, where P = [110.11 0; 0 0.12]. The Lyapunov-based controller utilized was
a proportional controller of the form h(x) = −1.6x1 − 0.01x2 (27) subject to input constraints
(|u| ≤ 3.5 kmol/m3). The stability region was set to ρ = 440 (i.e., Ωρ = {x ∈ R2 : V (x) ≤ ρ})
and ρe = 330. The LEMPC receives full state feedback (Remark 11) with the full system state
x = [x1 x2]
T which is measured and sent to the LEMPC at synchronous time instants tk. A high-
gain observer is used as the redundant estimator to estimate the reactant concentration of species A
from continuously available temperature measurements (x2). The design of this high-gain observer
follows27 with respect to a transformed system state obtained via input-output linearization. The
observer equation using the set of new coordinates is as follows:
˙̂z = Aẑ + L(y − Cẑ) (55)
where ẑ is the state estimate vector in the new coordinate, y is the output measurement, A =
[0 1; 0 0], C = [1 0], and L = [100 10000]T . To obtain the state estimate of the system z, the inverse
transformation T−1(ẑ) is applied.
For the detection conditions of Eq. 36, data from an attack-free scenario is gathered by simulating
the process under the proposed LEMPC described above. We simulate this attack-free event over
1 h of operation with the system state initialized o steady-state at xinit = [CA−CAs T − Ts][−0.7
kmol/m3 -30 K]T in MATLAB R2017b, with the function tolerance set to 10−7. A constraint of the
form of Eq. 8f was enforced at the end of each sampling period both when the constraint of Eq. 8g
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was activated and when it was not. The controller receives a state measurement subject to bounded
measurement noise and the process is subject to bounded disturbances. Specically, the noise is
represented by a standard normal distribution with mean zero, standard deviations of 0.01 kmol/m3
and 0.5 K, and bounds of 0.02 kmol/m3 and 0.5 K for the concentration of the reactant and reactor
temperature, respectively. In addition, process disturbances was added to the right-hand side of
the dierential equations describing the rates of change of CA and T with zero mean and standard
deviations of 0.5 kmol/m3 h and 2 K/h, and bounds of 2 kmol/m3 h and 5 K/h, respectively. The
norm |x̃(tk) − z(tk)| was bounded after 0.2 h under an attack-free simulation below 0.9520 (which
was taken to be ϵmax and used to ag attacks in the remainder of the example).
To ensure that not all estimators are impacted by attacks as required, the control system under
state feedback LEMPC is subjected to false state measurements of reactant concentration (which
have the form x1 + 0.1 kmol/m
3 h; i.e., the temperature measurements are intact and only the
full state feedback measurements are impacted with the high gain observer not impacted as it
only uses measurements of the un-attacked sensor, the temperature). These false measurements
are always provided to the controller after 0.3 h of operation. We simulate the process under the
proposed control design over 1 h of operation with the process state initialized o steady-state
again from xinit = [−0.7 kmol/m3 -30 K]T in MATLAB R2017b using fmincon. The measurement
noise and disturbances follow the same standard normal distribution described above. To solve
the optimization problem of Eq. 8, we use the following initial guess: at the rst sampling time
the value of the Lyapunov-based controller h(x) is used while for the subsequent sampling times,
a shifted version of the optimal solution of the previous sampling time is utilized and the guess of
the last entry of the optimal input vector is based on h(x). Fig. 2 depicts the closed-loop state
trajectory in contrast with the closed-loop state estimate trajectory after 0.2 h of operation. As
soon as the cyberattack policy was implemented at 0.3 h, the control/detection strategy promptly
agged abnormal behavior at the subsequent sampling time, when the closed-loop state was still
within the stability region, which could allow a backup policy to be employed.
We can also explore a case where an attack happens but the proposed detection mechanism does
not ag it during process operation. Specically, we consider that the false state measurements for
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Figure 2: Comparison between the closed-loop state trajectory under attack (solid line) and the closed-loop state
estimate trajectory (dashed lines) after 0.2 h of operation under the state feedback LEMPC.
reactant concentration above now have the form x1 + 0.01 kmol/m
3 h (which follows an attack
trajectory with similarities to that in Fig. 2 but a better match between the measurement and
estimate trajectories for CA) and are always provided to the controller after 0.3 h of operation.
In this case, although the attack was not agged during the simulation, the closed-loop state was
maintained in Ωρ under the proposed control design for the time period simulated, demonstrating
the concept that with the process subject to suciently small measurement noise and disturbances,
the closed-loop state can be maintained in Ωρ.
The proposed control/detection approach may also identify an attack if both state measurements
are attacked as long as the condition |x̃(tk) − z(tk)| ≤ ϵmax to ag an attack still holds (despite
that attack detection if all measurements are attacked is not guaranteed in Section Cyberattack-
Resilient Output Feedback LEMPC: Stability and Feasibility Analysis to be agged). To show this,
we consider the case where false state measurements of both reactant concentration and temperature
of the form x1+0.01 kmol/m
3 and x2+1 K, respectively, are provided to the sensors after 0.3 h. As
soon as this attack was implemented (at 0.3 h), an attack was detected since the norm |x̃(tk)−z(tk)|
was larger than the threshold (again with the closed-loop state still in the stability region at the
detection time).
Conclusions
In light of the diculty of guaranteeing cyberattack-resilience using LEMPC design only, as was
analyzed in our prior work,14 this work aimed to investigate how the control-theoretic guarantees of
LEMPC might be leveraged with detection techniques to attempt to prevent false sensor measure-
33
ments from causing closed-loop stability issues in a chemical plant. Three cyberattack detection
concepts using LEMPC design were explored. The rst strategy focused on the use of random
designs of LEMPC's around alternative steady-states within the stability region to check whether
the theoretical property of the randomly generated LEMPC's (i.e., that the value of the Lyapunov
function that the LEMPC is designed with respect to should decrease over the sampling period
following the activation of this LEMPC) is met by the process state measurements. The second
strategy focused on a state prediction, detection, and control framework that guarantees that the
closed-loop state is maintained in a stability region for one sampling period after an undetected
attack. Finally, the third strategy focused on a state estimation, detection, and control framework
that assumed that multiple state estimators were available for the process and that at least one
could be compromised by a false sensor measurement attack. A key challenge for future work is
better understanding the limits of what can be achieved, theoretically and fundamentally, in terms
of securing control systems against cyberattacks on their various components. This work focused
only on sensor attacks; however, there are many possible routes by which an attack may be per-
formed on a cyberphysical system, and when the attacks are too extensive (e.g., the attacker gains
control of many aspects of the control loop) it may be dicult to provide guarantees on process
behavior during the attack.
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Figure 3: V1 (top plots) and V2 (bottom plots) proles over 0.1 h of operation for the process example in the presence
of dierent cyberattack policies.
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Figure 4: Comparison between the closed-loop state trajectory under attack (solid line) and the closed-loop state
estimate trajectory (dashed lines) after 0.2 h of operation under the state feedback LEMPC.
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